2024

1. TCC

   Homomorphic Secret Sharing with Verifiable Evaluation

   Arka Rai Choudhuri, Aarushi Goel, Aditya Hegde, and Abhishek Jain

2023

1. CCS

   Scalable Multiparty Garbling

   Gabrielle Beck, Aarushi Goel, Aditya Hegde, Abhishek Jain, Zhengzhong Jin, and Gabriel Kaptchuk

   [summary] [eprint] [code]

   Does there exist an efficient and scalable multiparty garbling protocol? We present a concretely efficient multiparty garbling protocol in the honest majority setting with total communication complexity independent of the number of parties and total computation complexity linear in the number of parties.

2022

1. ASIACRYPT

   Attaining GOD Beyond Honest Majority with Friends and Foes

   Aditya Hegde, Nishat Koti, Varsha Bhat Kukkala, Shravani Patil, Arpita Patra, and Protik Paul

   [summary] [eprint] [code]

   Can we construct MPC protocols with GOD that don't need to reveal secrets to an honest party in the worst case? We present an efficient 4-party protocol in the Friends and Foes model tolerating one malicious party and one semi-honest party. Unlike most other MPC protocols with GOD for a small number of parties, an honest party does not need to be elevated to a trusted third party to compute the output and inputs remain private against both honest and corrupt parties despite any malicious behaviour, including making the protocol transcript of corrupt parties public. This ensures robustness of computation while supporting a more intuitive definition of privacy (where inputs are never revealed to a single party) which makes it amenable to real world applications.

2. EUROCRYPT

   Secure Multiparty Computation with Free Branching

   Aarushi Goel, Mathias Hall-Andersen, Aditya Hegde, and Abhishek Jain

   [summary] [eprint] [code]

   Can we construct n-party MPC protocols for conditional circuits that have a communication complexity independent of the number of branches? We present compilers that can transform a large class of generic MPC protocols into those for conditional circuits which achieve communication complexity independent of the number of branches and linear in the size of the largest branch. We discuss construction of semi-honest constant round protocols, and semi-honest and malicious non-constant round protocols.

2021

1. PETS

   SoK: Efficient Privacy-preserving Clustering

   Aditya Hegde, Helen Möllering, Thomas Schneider, and Hossein Yalame

   [summary] [eprint] [code]

   What are the current approaches for privacy-preserving clustering and are they suitable for real-life application? We survey prior works on privacy-preserving clustering and summarize the approach used to design secure clustering protocols. We evaluate the state-of-the-art protocols and discuss their limitations for real world applications with respect to efficiency and quality of clustering. We also discuss current open challenges in applying current privacy-preserving clustering protocols when compared to their plaintext variants to set the stage for future research.

2020

1. INDOCRYPT

   High Throughput Secure MPC Over Small Population in Hybrid Networks (Extended Abstract)

   Ashish Choudhury, and Aditya Hegde

   [summary] [paper]

   How can we design efficient MPC protocols for a small number of parties that make minimal synchrony assumptions about the network? We discuss high-throughput 4-party MPC protocols in the partially synchronous and asynchronous settings making a step towards constructing efficient protocols in this setting. Our work partially answers one of the open problems of PR18 to design a perfectly secure MPC protocol over partially synchronous networks with 2 initial synchronous rounds.

2. IJCAI

   Ethics, Prosperity, and Society: Moral Evaluation Using Virtue Ethics and Utilitarianism

   Aditya Hegde*, Vibhav Agarwal*, and Shrisha Rao

   [summary] [paper]

   Can we incorporate ethical decision making and its impact on reputation in agent based models? We propose a framework that attempts to model reputation and ethics using virtue ethics and utilitarianism. Our simulations show that unethical agents make short term gains but are less prosperous in the long run. We find that unethical agents have high incentive to become ethical in societies which strongly reward ethical behavior. The opposite is true of societies which strongly penalize unethical behavior.